Abstract
A baseline model
where 1. The …nal goods producer solves
where P t (i) the price of the i-th type of intermediate goods. The …rst-order conditions lead to the following inverse demand functions for intermediate goods:
2 The countercyclical markup is consistent with data (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) ).
Financial Constraints, Endogenous Markups, and Self-fulfilling where the aggregate price index is
Intermediate goods producers. The technology for producing intermediate goods is given by
where A > 0, 0 < < 1. We assume symmetry: the technology for producing intermediate goods is the same for all i.
The pro…t for i'th intermediate good producer is
Denote by t = 
The Financial Constraints. Unlike the …nal goods producer, that producers of intermediate goods are assumed to face …nancial constraints due to limited enforcement. In our simple benchmark model we assume that in the beginning of each period, the i'th intermediate goods …rm decides to rent capital K t (i) from the households and hire labor N t (i).
The …rm promises to pay w t N t (i) + r t K t (i) b t (i) at the end of the period. In this sense, the households are e¤ectively providing credit to …nance the …rm's working capital. However the …rm may default on its contract or promise. We assume that if the …rm does not pay its debt b t (i), the households can recover a fraction < 1 of the …rm's revenue P t (i)Y t (i) by incurring a liquidation cost f . 3 One possibility is that the …rm must pay the labor wages as production takes place , and that creditors can always redeem the physical capital, but that the interest on borrowing may not be fully recoverable. So if the household can recover P t (i)Y t (i) f , they will lend to the …rm only if P t (i)Y t (i) f can at least cover the wage bill plus principal and interest. Knowing that the household cannot recover more than P t (i)Y t (i) f , the …rm will have no incentive to repay more than P t (i)Y t (i) f . The incentive-compatiblity constraint for the …rm then is:
or
After substituting P t (i) from equation (3) into equation (8) , the pro…t maximization for the i 0 th …rm becomes 
Given w t ; r t , …nal output Y t , and the borrowing constraint (11), the feasible choices of Y t (i) are represented by the 1 3 To calibrate < 1 we note that outstanding credit market debt for domestic non-…nancial business corporate and non-corporate sectors in the US in 2012 stood at 12 trillion, or about 77% of GDP.See the Federal Reserve "Flow of Funds report", June 07, 2012, table D.3 in particular, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1.pdf Financial Constraints, Endogenous Markups, and Self-fulfilling shaded area in Figure 1 . If we denote by t (i) the Lagrangian multiplier of constraint (11), the …rst-order conditions for the pro…t maximization are r t K t (i) = t Y t (i); (12)
and
with the slackness condition h Y 
Households

4
We now turn to the intertemporal optimization problem faced by a representative household. To facilitate the stability analysis of a steady state, we set our model in continuous time. Note that since …rms have identical production functions, in a symmetric equilibrium we have
The instantaneous utility of the representative household is given by 4 In an alternative formulation the …rm also borrows enough to directly purchase its capital stock in addition to its needs for operating costs: wtNt(i) + (1 + rt) Kt(i): If for simplicity we assume that lenders can always recover the capital stock in case of default but only a fraction of the output, the constraint becomes wtNt(i) + (1 + rt) Kt(i) Pt(i)Yt(i) + Kt(i) f: After cancelling Kt(i) from both sides, we again have the constraint (9). In this case however debt would exceed GDP, since it would include the borrowed capital stock. Of course some part of the capital stock may represent business equity that also yielding a competitive return of rt, rather than debt. In such a case however equity returns and principal may be subordinated to debt, but for simplicity we may abstract from these considerations.
Financial Constraints, Endogenous Markups, and Self-fulfilling where C is consumption, N is labor supply, and 0. Taking the market interest rate r t and wage w t as given, the representative household maximizes
subject to
where K t is the capital stock and K 0 is given. We model endogenous capacity utilization along the lines of Greenwood,
1
Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988) . For simplicity we assume that the households choose the capacity utilization rate e t . A 2 higher e t implies that the capital is more intensively utilized, at the cost of faster depreciation, so that (e t ) is a convex 3 increasing function. The parameter represents the discount rate, and t is total pro…t of all …rms.
4
We note at this point that the indeterminacy results that follow will hold even in the absence of variable capacity 5 utilization, but we include it in our model to improve calibration results in section 2.7..
6
The …rst-order conditions for the household's optimization problem are given by
Equilibrium
7
An equilibrium of our economy is a collection of prices fw t ; r t ; P t (i)g and quantities fK t (i); N t (i); Y t (i); Y t ; K t ; N t ; e t ; t g such that a) given the prices and the aggregate t , the households choose K t , e t and N t to maximize their utility; b)
given P t (i), the …nal good …rm chooses fY t (i)g to maximize its pro…ts de…ned in (2); c) given w t ; r t , and the …nancial constraint (11), the intermediate goods producers maximizes its pro…t by choosing K t (i) and N t (i); and all markets clear. The budget constraint becomes
The wage w t and the interest rate r t are
Equation (14) becomes
We then have the following lemma regarding the …nancial constraint (11).
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The intuition for Lemma 1 is as follows. The …rms'pro…t function is t (i) = Y borrow only an additional (1 1 ), which is not enough to cover the marginal unit production cost t .
We will focus on the parameters that make …nancial constraint (11) always binding in equilibrium. To summarize,
8
the following system of equations fully characterize the equilibrium
subject to the constraint (1 1 ) < t < 1 1 . Following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988) let the depreciation function be given by
We then have
5 Formally,
(1 1 ) 
3. Equation (35) then implies (e) = 0
We set 0 = (1 + ) = to normalize e to 1. 
5. Given N; K and e = 1, we can then obtain output using equation (31) as
6. Finally from the de…nition of = f Y , we have
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Lemma 2 If 0 < f < , then equation (36) has at least two solutions such that After obtaining the steady state (Y; K; N; C; ), we log-linearize the system of equations around the steady state value.
7
We denote byX t the percentage deviation of variable X t from its steady state value X t , that is,X t = log X t log X.
. Then the log-linearized system of equations is
where = : Note that can also be de…ned by the steady state value of as = . EliminatingN t from equation
10
(41),^ t from equation (44), andê t from equation (43) allows us to obtain the expression forŶ t in terms of capital and 11 consumption. We …rst substituteê t out of the production function to obtain
! 1Nt + ! 2Kt 6 We discuss the conditions that give a steady state with (1 1 ) < < (1 1 ) in section 2.7..
where
and ! 2 = 1+ (1+ ) . It is easy to check that ! 1 + ! 2 > 1 if > 0. Finally we need to substitute outN t . Combining the labor demand and labor supply curves we havê
Using the factor^ t = Ŷ t from (44), the log-linearized Euler condition becomes:
Then equation (40) yields
In a matrix form
Notice that we have used the factor = to substitute out in J. The local dynamics around the steady state is determined by the roots of J: The trace of the J is
and the determinant of J is
The roots of J, x 1 and x 2 satisfy the following constraints
If det(J) > 0 and Trace(J) < 0, then the roots x 1 and x 2 will both be negative, and the model will have local 5 indeterminacy around the steady state. Since given other parameters the trace and determinant are functions of and
6
, we will …rst examine the possibility of indeterminacy in the parameter space of and . We will then use the mapping 7 between ( , ) and (f , ) to establish the possibility of indeterminacy supported by the deep parameters of the model.
8
Financial Constraints, Endogenous Markups, and Self-fulfilling Proposition 4 Let and satisfy the following two constraints
and 1 < min( 1 + ;
1+
(1 + ) (1 + )(1 )
(1 )(1 + ) (1 + )(1 )
Proof. See Appendix A1.
2
To gain intuition for self-ful…lling expectations of higher output and higher factor rewards, we …rst focus on labor demand and supply curves incorporating the equilibrium e¤ects of the borrowing constraint on marginal costs and markups. The labor demand curve is given bŷ
and the labor supply curve in the economy isŵ
The slope of the labor market demand curve is positive and steeper than that of the labor supply curve under the marginal costs through wages and the rental rate on capital. If households expect a higher equilibrium output, they 7 will be willing to increase their lending to …rms. Given positive …xed collection costs f; an expected increase in output 8 levels relaxes the borrowing constraint disproportionately more so that the unit marginal costs of …rms, t = f Yt ; 9 can rise and markups can fall. This implies that as …rms compete for inputs, factor rewards will also increases with Y t .
10
The labor demand curve incorporating these general equilibrium e¤ects on marginal costs will then be positively sloped 11 and steeper than the labor supply curve. Normally, higher output levels increase the demand for leisure, so barring 12 inferiority in preferences, the higher demand for labor will be contained by the income e¤ect on labor supply. However 13 if the labor demand slopes up more steeply than labor supply, employment will increase robustly as the labor supply 14 curve shifts to the left with income e¤ects. The rise in labor hours as well as the accumulation of capital will raise 15 output, so that the optimistic output expectations of households will be self-ful…lling.
16
Before turning to calibrations, we formally state the indeterminacy result of the paper. We de…ne the set = f( ; )jconstraint(55); constraint(56)are satisf iedg.
Proof. For ( ; f ) 2 , by construction we can …nd a solution for and such that
And since ( ; )2 , we have T race < 0; det(J) > 0 by Proposition The liquidation costs include the …xed cost f and the loss in output (1 )Y . So in the steady state they account for the fraction f =Y + (1 ) of total output (sales revenue).
Financial steady state equilibrium such that 1 < < 1 . Notice that if f = 0 and = , as long as < 1 , the condition 1 < < 1 is automatically satis…ed. This implies that for < 1 the minimum f is zero. But if 1 then f = 0 (hence = ) is no longer consistent with the equilibrium. If f is too small, then will be larger than
We can write it as
On the other hand if f is too large, then the marginal cost will fall below 1 . Now maximizing f over 1 < < 1 the upper bound for f for a given is
For these feasible parameters, if f is greater than some cut-o¤ level, then the implied will be bigger than min . It turns out that the condition < max is automatically satis…ed. The cut-o¤ f can be determined by
For any f such that f cut ( ) f < f max ( ), we have > min , so the model is locally indeterminate around the steady 8 state. In Figure 2 , the indeterminacy region is shown in red. In this section we argue that it is not the …xed liquidation costs per se that generates indeterminacy. It is the procyclical leverage generated by …xed liquidity costs that is the source of indeterminacy. Note that with …xed costs the debt to GDP ratio b t =Y t = f =Y t is procyclical. In what follows, we construct an example in which the …rm's borrowing constraint is
is an increasing function of
Yt Y with (1) = < 1 and 0 (1) = . In this case, the marginal cost is t = t . The condition t 1 < t < 1 is automatically satis…ed, so the borrowing constraint is binding.
The equilibrium can be characterized by a system of nonlinear equations similar to equations (28) The equilibrium is characterized by:
The local dynamics around the steady state is:
where 1 = 
Proof. See Appendix A2. 
Credit Constraints and Firms' Savings
9
In our model, credit constraints gives …rms incentives to build up a large amount of savings from retained earnings.
10
This would allow them to eventually overcome the borrowing constraints. The possibility that the constrained agents 11 will ultimately accumulate enough wealth to become fully self-…nancing is well-known in the extensive literature using 12 models of credit constraints. To explain why …rms nonetheless hold large amounts of debt despite credit constraints 13 (see footnote2.1.), the literature has introduced several additional features into models of credit constraints. A standard 14 approach is to assume that the borrower has a …nite lifetime (see e.g., Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Song,
15
Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) among many others). Another common approach is to assume the borrowers discount With minor modi…cations and reinterpretations, it is possible to transform our model so that its local dynamics around the steady states associated with (68) are isomorphic to the dynamics in Wen (1998).
Financial Constraints, Endogenous Markups, and Self-fulfilling …nance literature assumes that there are tax bene…ts of debt. Finally, as pointed by Jensen (1986), …rms typically 1 prefer debt …nancing because of the agency problem between the manager and the shareholders. The ideas is that the 2 managers may use retained earnings to bene…t their own private interests, for example by having large expense accounts 3 and management perks. Arellano, Bai and Kehoe (2012) have recently incorporated the ideas of Jensen (1986) into their 4 model to prevent …rms to become fully self-…nancing.
5
We use a slightly modify the approach of Arellano, Bai and Kehoe (2012) to model the agency problem introduced 6 by Jensen (1986). We focus on the conditions under which …rms have no incentive to save. For this purpose, we use a 7 discrete time model to illustrate the intuition. When the time interval between two period t and t+1 approaches zero, 8 the discrete model will converge its counterpart in continuous time.
9
Denote the value of a …rm with retained earning S t (i) in period t as V t (S t (i)). The …rm then solves
with a credit constraint to be speci…ed below. We assume that the return on the retained earning is the risk free rate, and satis…es 1 = R f t E t C t =C t+1 . The parameter 1 > > 0 captures the agency problem between the managers and the shareholders as in Jensen (1986) if the managers can use a fraction of the retained earning for their own non-veri…able private bene…t. In addition, we assume that the …rm makes factor payment paid after the production is completed (maybe to assure that households do not walk away after receive their factor's payment). Since …rms'savings (retained earnings) are liquid they can also easily divert them if they default. Speci…cally, we assume the …rm can divert a fraction 1 ! of its retained earning in default, as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2012). Instead of assuming a …xed liquidity cost, we assume, as in in case of default in section 3.1., that the creditors can re-claim a fraction ( Yt Y ) of the …rm's total sale revenue As discussed in section 3.1., the general function ( Yt Y ) allows more ‡exibility. The borrowing constraint (61) then changes to
Finally we assume that S t+1 (i) 0. We are interested in obtaining parameters such that in the steady state S t+1 (i) = 0.
Denote t as the Lagrangian multipler of the constraint (72). In a symmetric equilibrium, we have
The intuition for this equation is as follows. Here ! (1 1 ) t =( t (1 1 )) is external …nancial premium. Because of the borrowing constraint ( t > 0), the …rm values a dollar internal saving more than a dollar: one dollar allows the 11 …rm to relax its credit constraint by ! dollars to produce an additional 1=( t (1 1 )) units output. Each unit of output yields a pro…t of (1 1 ) t . The …rm will have no incentive to save if and only if
So in the steady state with S = 0 we have = by equation (72). Then the above restriction implies
Clearly either su¢ ciently large or su¢ ciently small ! will satisfy the above constraint so that S t+1 (i) = 0 in the steady 2 state. For small ‡uctuations around the steady state we will have S t+1 (i) = 0 and the equilibrium condition will then 3 be the same to these in the benchmark model.
4
Alternatively we can assume that …rms face stochastic death as in the model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Suppose a …rm has a probability of exit and a measure of new …rms enter in each period. So the number of …rms is stationary. We focus on the conditions under which all …rms have no incentive to save. This then requires
In the steady state, this becomes 1 > (1 )[1 + ! 
Simulations and Impuse Responses
11
We now use our calibrated model to compute the implied moments and cross moments of consumption, investment,
12
hours and output, and study the impulse responses of our model. We …rst write the model in discrete time and solve it 13 by log-linearizing the equations that characterize the equilibrium around the steady state. We adopt a parameterization with a continuum of equilibria. To coordinate the expectations of agents we therefore rely on sunspot shocks. Below we 19 study whether the various moments and impulse responses generated by our model with sunspots can match the data.
20
We begin without productivity shocks.The model's solution takes the form
Financial Constraints, Endogenous Markups, and Self-fulfilling where M is a two-by-two matrix and " t+1 =Ĉ t+1 E tĈt+1 is the zero mean iid sunspot shock. Since we work with a linearized model we can compute the relative moments and cross moments analytically. 10 The remaining variables can be written as functions ofK t andĈ t : 0
where H is a four-by-two matrix.
1 Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of output, investment, consumption and hours to an unexpected one percentage 2 increase in the initial consumption level induced by the agent's optimistic expectations about future income, under the 3 calibration of parameters given above. These impulse response functions resemble those obtained in the models with increasing returns to scale. From Figure 3 7 we see that output, investment, consumption and hours commove. The impulse responses also demonstrate that labor 8 is slightly more volatile than output, an important feature of the data that the standard RBC model has di¢ culty 9 explaining with a TFP shock. They also exhibit cycles in output, investment, consumption and hours, so the model 10 has the potential to explain the boom-bust patterns often observed in data. However, as in the models with increasing 11 returns to scale, the extremely large impact of autonomous consumption on output and investment seems empirically 12 unjusti…ed. In the impact period, one percentage increase in consumption leads to a 27 percent increase in output and 1 a 116 percent increase in investment.
2
These volatile responses of output and investment can be understood by studying the e¤ect of consumption on labor.
Equating the labor demand (58) and labor supply (59) we havê
1 is the slope of the labor demand curve and is the slope of the labor supply curve. When these two slopes are close, a one percentage increase in autonomous consumption increase can lead to huge increases in labor and hence output. Denote s as the ratio of steady state investment to income. Then from the resource constraint,
so it is clear that the combination of smooth consumption and volatile income will make investment even more volatile 3 as s << 1. In the current calibration s = 0:23. So the response of investment upon impact will be about 4.4 times that 4 of output.
5 Table 1 reports some basic moments of the linearized model assuming that sunspots are the only driving force. All corr(X t ; X t 1 ) computes the …rst-order autocorrelation of X t .
17
To better match the relative volatilities of consumption and output we now introduce a TFP shock into the model. We assume that the technology level in the economy follows an AR(1) procesŝ
We assume that log(G t ) = g log(G t 1 ) + " gt . We choose g = = 0:90 as in Benhabib We conclude that borrowing or collateral constraints can be a source of self-ful…lling ‡uctuations in economies that 7 have no increasing returns to scale in production. Expectations of higher output can relax borrowing constraints, and 8 …rms can expand their output by bidding up factor prices and eliciting a labor supply response that allows the initial 9 expectations to be ful…lled. The parameter ranges and markups that allow self-ful…lling expectations to occur are within 10 realistic ranges and compatible with US macroeconomic data. Simulating our data we obtain moments and impulse
11
responses that match the US macroeconomic data reasonably well. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for indeterminacy is that Trace (J) < 0 and So the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the trace to be negative is:
(1 + ) < (1 + )(1 ) < 
